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Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism
Bibliography: pages 136-144.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Philosophy
2016
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| _version_ | 1867613284415307777 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Williamson, Francis Xavier |
| author2 | Shutte, Augustine |
| author_browse | Shutte, Augustine Williamson, Francis Xavier |
| author_facet | Shutte, Augustine Williamson, Francis Xavier |
| author_sort | Williamson, Francis Xavier |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | Bibliography: pages 136-144. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/17153 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:33:41.762Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateRange | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | Department of Philosophy |
| publisherStr | Department of Philosophy |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/17153 Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism Williamson, Francis Xavier Shutte, Augustine Mechanism (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) Bibliography: pages 136-144. This thesis is an attempt to defend explanatory incompatibilism, the view that mechanistic and intentional explanations of behaviour are incompatible, against various sorts of objections which come in the form of rival compatibilist theories. In the first chapter the author outlines the prima facie case for explanatory incompatibilism. This prima facie case is then bolstered by a discussion of explanation in general, conditions of compatibility for different explanations of the same phenomenon, and then a more rigorous account of mechanistic and intentional explanations which allows for a formal presentation of an argument for their incompatibility. Chapters Two, Three and Four discuss some of the combatibilist theories which have been advanced. Chapter Two involves a discussion of the "Double-Language" version of compatibilism as advocated by Ryle and Melden. This version is rejected for two main reasons: (1) it fails to keep the two sorts of explanation sufficiently apart so as to render them compatible, and (2) it fails to show that intentional explanations are not a species of causal explanation. Chapter Three attempts to deal with the "Instrumentalist" version of compatibilism as advanced by Daniel Dennett. This is rejected because it fails to provide a rich enough account of rational action and it also leads to epiphenomenalism. In Chapter Four the author discusses the "Physicalist" approach to the question of compatibility as advocated by Alvin Goldman and Donald Davidson. But this version of compatibilism is found to be wanting because it also leads to the epiphenomenalism of the mental. Chapter Five, the conclusion, summarises the basic argument and attempts to develop the author's own account of what the necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action are. This is found to involve· three main elements: physical indeterminism, intentional intelligibility, and then something like the concept of agent-causation. In the course of this account there is a brief discussion of the problem of other minds and an argument against the desire-belief model of action and its explanation based on its inability to cope with the problem of deviant causal chains. It is concluded that mechanistic and intentional explanations are indeed incompatible and something is said about the broad metaphysical view which is required to accommodate this fact. 2016-02-22T07:13:36Z 2016-02-22T07:13:36Z 1988 Master Thesis Masters MA http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities University of Cape Town |
| spellingShingle | Mechanism (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) Williamson, Francis Xavier Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| title_full | Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| title_fullStr | Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| title_short | Mechanism and rationality : the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| title_sort | mechanism and rationality the case for explanatory incompatibilism |
| topic | Mechanism (Philosophy) Intentionality (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/17153 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsonfrancisxavier mechanismandrationalitythecaseforexplanatoryincompatibilism |