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The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others
In this paper, I aim to explore the problem of easy knowledge, outlined by Stewart Cohen (2002). I will examine the solutions given by Cohen (2002, 2005), Markie (2005), Black (2008),Klein (2004) and Becker (2013), and outline the problems that each faces. These problems, I will argue, constitute su...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Philosophy
2019
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| _version_ | 1867613274709688320 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | White, Matthew Neil |
| author2 | Chapman, Dean |
| author_browse | Chapman, Dean White, Matthew Neil |
| author_facet | Chapman, Dean White, Matthew Neil |
| author_sort | White, Matthew Neil |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | In this paper, I aim to explore the problem of easy knowledge, outlined by Stewart Cohen (2002). I will examine the solutions given by Cohen (2002, 2005), Markie (2005), Black (2008),Klein (2004) and Becker (2013), and outline the problems that each faces. These problems, I will argue, constitute sufficient grounds to reject each of these theories as they stand. Following this, I will argue that we can adjust Becker’s (2013) theory such that it is able not only to adequately avoid the problem of easy knowledge, but also to give us a reasonable account of when and how we know and do not know propositions about the world. The central adjustment that I will make to Becker’s theory is to adopt a kind of epistemic contextualism. In particular, I will be drawing heavily on Jonathan Ichikawa’s (2011) essay on closure and contextualism in modal theories of epistemology. The consequences of adopting this perspective are that in heavyweight philosophical contexts, we turn out to know nothing at all - however, in ordinary everyday contexts, we can justifiably claim knowledge about the kinds of propositions we think we ought to be able to claim knowledge about. This consequence is pleasing to me, as it gives skeptical hypotheses their due - it treats them with the seriousness that they deserve, and admits that they are (often) unsolvable - while still preserving our intuitive belief that we can know many things about the external world. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/30516 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:33:31.121Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateRange | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Department of Philosophy |
| publisherStr | Department of Philosophy |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/30516 The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others White, Matthew Neil Chapman, Dean In this paper, I aim to explore the problem of easy knowledge, outlined by Stewart Cohen (2002). I will examine the solutions given by Cohen (2002, 2005), Markie (2005), Black (2008),Klein (2004) and Becker (2013), and outline the problems that each faces. These problems, I will argue, constitute sufficient grounds to reject each of these theories as they stand. Following this, I will argue that we can adjust Becker’s (2013) theory such that it is able not only to adequately avoid the problem of easy knowledge, but also to give us a reasonable account of when and how we know and do not know propositions about the world. The central adjustment that I will make to Becker’s theory is to adopt a kind of epistemic contextualism. In particular, I will be drawing heavily on Jonathan Ichikawa’s (2011) essay on closure and contextualism in modal theories of epistemology. The consequences of adopting this perspective are that in heavyweight philosophical contexts, we turn out to know nothing at all - however, in ordinary everyday contexts, we can justifiably claim knowledge about the kinds of propositions we think we ought to be able to claim knowledge about. This consequence is pleasing to me, as it gives skeptical hypotheses their due - it treats them with the seriousness that they deserve, and admits that they are (often) unsolvable - while still preserving our intuitive belief that we can know many things about the external world. 2019-08-26T09:32:57Z 2019-08-26T09:32:57Z 2019 2019-08-26T08:27:27Z Master Thesis Masters Master of Arts http://hdl.handle.net/11427/30516 eng application/pdf Department of Philosophy Faculty of Humanities |
| spellingShingle | White, Matthew Neil The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| title_full | The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| title_fullStr | The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| title_short | The Problem of Easy Knowledge - Critical Perspectives on Cohen and Others |
| title_sort | problem of easy knowledge critical perspectives on cohen and others |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/30516 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT whitematthewneil theproblemofeasyknowledgecriticalperspectivesoncohenandothers AT whitematthewneil problemofeasyknowledgecriticalperspectivesoncohenandothers |