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Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa
This paper examines the gap in social insurance coverage in semi-formal enterprises, and explores options for incentivising participation by lower income workers in a comprehensive statutory social security scheme. A probit model is used to quantify current patterns of UIF and pension coverage. The...
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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School of Economics
2022
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| _version_ | 1867613182844993536 |
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| access_status_str | Open Access |
| author | Borros, Georgina |
| author2 | Donaldson, Andrew |
| author_browse | Borros, Georgina Donaldson, Andrew |
| author_facet | Donaldson, Andrew Borros, Georgina |
| author_sort | Borros, Georgina |
| collection | Thesis |
| description | This paper examines the gap in social insurance coverage in semi-formal enterprises, and explores options for incentivising participation by lower income workers in a comprehensive statutory social security scheme. A probit model is used to quantify current patterns of UIF and pension coverage. The analysis confirms that business owners, employees in the informal sector and those without an employment contract are significantly less likely to participate. A transition matrix is used to assess the trends in participation over the 2020 lockdown period - showing a statistically significant increase in pension fund and UIF participation, which suggests that the Covid-19 TERS benefit generated an availability heuristic effect. Two subsidy models are examined, designed to incentivise wider participation: the first being a subsidy for comprehensive social insurance cover (including pension and unemployment insurance) and the second a subsidisation of unemployment insurance only. Both subsidy models are costed. In the event of full participation, the unemployment insurance subsidy would cost the state R16 billion annually, while a comprehensive social insurance subsidy would amount to R48 billion annually. The unemployment insurance subsidy is advised as an immediate avenue for action, while the comprehensive plan remains a goal for higher welfare in the long run. |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/35647 |
| institution | University of Cape Town (South Africa) |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2026-06-10T12:32:05.102Z |
| license_str | Not specified — see source repository |
| provenance_str_mv | Harvested via OAI-PMH from UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publishDateRange | 2022 |
| publishDateSort | 2022 |
| publisher | School of Economics |
| publisherStr | School of Economics |
| record_format | dspace |
| source_str | UCTD — University of Cape Town Open Access Repository |
| spelling | oai:open.uct.ac.za:11427/35647 Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa Borros, Georgina Donaldson, Andrew Economics This paper examines the gap in social insurance coverage in semi-formal enterprises, and explores options for incentivising participation by lower income workers in a comprehensive statutory social security scheme. A probit model is used to quantify current patterns of UIF and pension coverage. The analysis confirms that business owners, employees in the informal sector and those without an employment contract are significantly less likely to participate. A transition matrix is used to assess the trends in participation over the 2020 lockdown period - showing a statistically significant increase in pension fund and UIF participation, which suggests that the Covid-19 TERS benefit generated an availability heuristic effect. Two subsidy models are examined, designed to incentivise wider participation: the first being a subsidy for comprehensive social insurance cover (including pension and unemployment insurance) and the second a subsidisation of unemployment insurance only. Both subsidy models are costed. In the event of full participation, the unemployment insurance subsidy would cost the state R16 billion annually, while a comprehensive social insurance subsidy would amount to R48 billion annually. The unemployment insurance subsidy is advised as an immediate avenue for action, while the comprehensive plan remains a goal for higher welfare in the long run. 2022-02-09T07:45:33Z 2022-02-09T07:45:33Z 2021 2022-01-31T11:05:15Z Master Thesis Masters MCom http://hdl.handle.net/11427/35647 eng application/pdf School of Economics Faculty of Commerce |
| spellingShingle | Economics Borros, Georgina Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| thesis_degree_str | Master's |
| title | Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| title_full | Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| title_fullStr | Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| title_full_unstemmed | Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| title_short | Take cover: Incentivising wider social insurance participation in South Africa |
| title_sort | take cover incentivising wider social insurance participation in south africa |
| topic | Economics |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11427/35647 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT borrosgeorgina takecoverincentivisingwidersocialinsuranceparticipationinsouthafrica |