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Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Central European Economic Journal
Format: Online Article RSS Article
Published: 2025
Subjects:
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container_title Central European Economic Journal
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journal_source_facet Central European Economic Journal
publishDate 2025
publishDateSort 2025
record_format rss_article
spellingShingle Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
Economic Sciences General
General
Economic Sciences General
sub_discipline_display General
sub_discipline_facet General
subject_display Economic Sciences General
General
Economic Sciences General
Economic Sciences General
General
Economic Sciences General
subject_facet Economic Sciences General
General
Economic Sciences General
title Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_auth Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_full Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_fullStr Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_full_unstemmed Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_short Takeover Bid Rules and M&A Premiums: Who Pays the Price for Investor Protection?
title_sort takeover bid rules and m&a premiums: who pays the price for investor protection?
topic Economic Sciences General
General
Economic Sciences General
url https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ceej-2025-0021